Liberals' National Popular Vote Scheme Is Unconstitutional and Dangerous
Liberals' National Popular Vote Scheme Is Unconstitutional and Dangerous
Liberals' National Popular Vote Scheme Is Unconstitutional and Dangerous
Liberals' National Popular Vote Scheme Is Unconstitutional and Dangerous
As of now, fourteen states have passed the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact (NPVIC), which attempts to eliminate the Electoral
College as set forth in the United States Constitution. There have been
many good articles written about the legality of interstate compacts
to achieve the desired National Popular Vote goals. The author does
not need to rehash all of those problems but believes that there are
three additional ways that the NPVIC is both unconstitutional and
dangerous.
Constitutional Flaw #1: Non-Republican Form of Government
Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution says in part that
"[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government." The United States is a
constitutional republic, where people elect their senators and
representatives at the national level. At the state level, this is
copied by every state except for Nebraska, which has a unique unicameral
Legislature. A Republican form of government, by its definition, means
that people elect representatives to represent them in running the
government. This is done so that the people are not encumbered with the
daily operations and voting to run the state or federal government.
A fundamental problem with the NPVIC is that it is inherently not a
republican form of government for a specific state to select that
state's Electors. Once a state Legislature decides to ask its citizens
their preference through a popular vote, there must be a rational basis
as to how the vote of the state's citizens is used to select that
state's electors. It is not rational that the people's decision could
be overruled by the votes of citizens of unrelated states. The
following comparison is between two states in the NPVIC who are at the
extremes of the Popular Vote Range for the 2016 election.
Vermont has three electoral votes in our existing system and cast 315,067 votes
for president in 2016. This constituted 0.23% of the total votes in
the nation. Under the NPVIC, Vermont will give other states 99.77% of
the power to select its state's electors for president instead of
maintaining the 100% control it presently has. Presently, there is a
total pool of 538 electors, and 0.23% constitutes 1.2 electors. Vermont
has irrationally thrown away its automatic control of three Electoral
Votes for an effective control of 1.2 electoral votes.
At the other extreme is the state of California, which has 55 electoral
votes in the present system. In the 2016 presidential election, there
were 14,181,595 votes cast for president in California, which
constituted 10.4% of the nation's total votes. California will give
other states 89.6% of the power to select its state's electors for
president instead of maintaining the 100% control it presently
has. California has traded 55 electoral votes for an effective 56
electoral votes. At least California's decision would result in a
higher number of effective electoral votes for the State, but it would
still hand 89.6% of the decision to other states.
Legislatures of small states are committing a form of legislative malpractice by
joining the NPVIC. The NPVIC is the latest in a 250-year history of
schemes where the populous states are trying to bully and dominate the
small states in the country. Under the guise of the perceived
unfairness of specific presidential election outcomes, the large states
are trying to fool the small states into giving up the finely balanced
power they were guaranteed when they joined the United States. In
addition, as different states implement different rules for voting, all other states would suffer the corruption of the national popular vote by sanctuary states. Those states allow non-citizens to vote in some elections and/or make it likely that errors will result in ineligible people voting in presidential elections.
Constitutional Flaw #2: Popular Vote Coercion
In 1824 (the 10th presidential election in U.S. history), there were four
candidates. More importantly, there were many ways that states selected
their electoral votes. In the 1824 election, the states of Delaware,
Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South Carolina, and Vermont did not have
any popular votes for president. At that time, these states had a total
of 71 electoral votes out of a total of 261. These states used various
approaches to apportion their electors in the manner they felt
best. For instance, New York had electors vote for the following
candidates: Andrew Jackson (1), John Quincy Adams (26), Henry Clay (4),
and William Crawford (5).
States have significant flexibility in choosing their electors. A state could have strong antiwar conscientious objector feelings and decide that it is morally wrong to select the commander in
chief of the Armed Forces. In this case, the Legislature could devise a
random process to select electors, or select none at all, so as not to
trample on the feelings of their citizens. Another state could believe
strongly in astrology and think birth sign is the most important factor in determining a
commander in chief. Its Legislature could apportion electors using a
formula based on the birth signs of the candidates. Though the author
hopes these seem extreme to the reader, it could be argued that they
have a rational basis from the perspective of their state legislatures.
Many states have used methods other than the popular vote to select their
presidential electors in our nation's history. The NPVIC would force
states to hold popular votes for president or lose power within our
constitutional republic. This coercion would occur since unless states
held a popular vote, and their votes were added into the national total,
they would lose power relative to the states in the NPVIC. In the year
2000, the U.S. Supreme Court re-highlighted the right of state
legislatures to select electors through various means in Bush v. Gore.
These approaches included having the state legislatures take back the
ability to choose electors from the people.
Constitutional Flaw #3: Removal of Critical Safety Mechanism
In the last 13 presidential elections, there have been two where a
third-party candidate received more than 10% of the votes: 1968-Wallace
(13.5%) and 1992-Perot (18.9%). There were an additional two
presidential elections where a third-party candidate received more than
5% of the vote: 1980-Anderson (6.6%) and 1996-Perot (8.4%). In addition
to the earlier described 1824 election, the 1860 election in the
lead-up to the Civil War had four major candidates. In the 1860
Election, the percentages of the popular vote were as follows: Lincoln
(39.8%), Douglas (29.5%), Breckinridge (18.1%), and Bell (12.6%). The
electoral vote percentages that showed popularity by State were very
different: Lincoln (180), Douglas (12), Breckinridge (72), and Bell
(39). The electoral votes show that even though Douglas had almost 30%
of the national popular vote, he was the least preferred candidate when
states selected their electors.
As the number of candidates for election increases, the likelihood of
having an extreme candidate receive the most popular votes goes up
dramatically. Germany held a federal election in November of 1932, and
the results were as follows: National Socialist German Workers Party
(33.1%), Social Democratic Party of Germany (20.4%), Communist Party
(16.9%), Centre Party (11.9%), and the German National People's Party
(8.3%). If a fifth major candidate had run for president in the United
States in 1824 or 1860, the percentages could have appeared similar. If
the reader hasn't figured it out yet, the leader of the National
Socialist German Workers Party was Adolf Hitler. Even though fewer than
one third of all German voters selected the National Socialist German
Workers Party, the NPVIC approach would have automatically made Adolf
Hitler president with no safety mechanism.
The Electoral College is only part of the genius of the system our founders
created to select a president. There is a second step involved if no
candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes. This has happened
twice (1800 and 1824), but the 1824 case is the more
illustrative. When no candidate receives a majority of the electoral
votes, the election goes to the United States House of
Representatives. Each state gets a single vote to choose among the top
three recipients of electoral votes, as specified by the 12th Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. In 1824, Andrew Jackson had the most popular
votes, and the most electoral votes, but they were not a majority.
In 1824, Andrew Jackson was a political outsider who was eyed with
distrust in Washington. When the Election of 1824 went to the U.S.
House of Representatives, the states were allowed to identify the best
compromise candidate they could find from the top three electoral vote
recipients. The U.S. House voted: John Quincy Adams (13), Andrew
Jackson (7), and William Crawford (4). John Quincy Adams, the son of
our country's second president, was elected president by the House of
Representatives in 1824. In spite of losing the 1824 election in the
House of Representatives, Andrew Jackson came back to win the presidency
outright in the Electoral College in 1828 and 1832, and he is honored
on the $20 bill.
Conclusion
In the 13 presidential elections that the author can remember, he has felt
emotions ranging from being thrilled, being happy, being worried, and
being disgusted with the results. Since we live in a great country,
where honest Americans can have different views, the author is sure that
many people felt differently. Unfortunately, the fact that someone
doesn't like who wins specific elections is no excuse for trying to
dramatically change the genius of our presidential election
system. This paper shows how the NPVIC would not only be
unconstitutional in three key ways, but would potentially be dangerous
to our nation.
Interstate Compact (NPVIC), which attempts to eliminate the Electoral
College as set forth in the United States Constitution. There have been
many good articles written about the legality of interstate compacts
to achieve the desired National Popular Vote goals. The author does
not need to rehash all of those problems but believes that there are
three additional ways that the NPVIC is both unconstitutional and
dangerous.
Constitutional Flaw #1: Non-Republican Form of Government
Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution says in part that
"[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government." The United States is a
constitutional republic, where people elect their senators and
representatives at the national level. At the state level, this is
copied by every state except for Nebraska, which has a unique unicameral
Legislature. A Republican form of government, by its definition, means
that people elect representatives to represent them in running the
government. This is done so that the people are not encumbered with the
daily operations and voting to run the state or federal government.
A fundamental problem with the NPVIC is that it is inherently not a
republican form of government for a specific state to select that
state's Electors. Once a state Legislature decides to ask its citizens
their preference through a popular vote, there must be a rational basis
as to how the vote of the state's citizens is used to select that
state's electors. It is not rational that the people's decision could
be overruled by the votes of citizens of unrelated states. The
following comparison is between two states in the NPVIC who are at the
extremes of the Popular Vote Range for the 2016 election.
Vermont has three electoral votes in our existing system and cast 315,067 votes
for president in 2016. This constituted 0.23% of the total votes in
the nation. Under the NPVIC, Vermont will give other states 99.77% of
the power to select its state's electors for president instead of
maintaining the 100% control it presently has. Presently, there is a
total pool of 538 electors, and 0.23% constitutes 1.2 electors. Vermont
has irrationally thrown away its automatic control of three Electoral
Votes for an effective control of 1.2 electoral votes.
At the other extreme is the state of California, which has 55 electoral
votes in the present system. In the 2016 presidential election, there
were 14,181,595 votes cast for president in California, which
constituted 10.4% of the nation's total votes. California will give
other states 89.6% of the power to select its state's electors for
president instead of maintaining the 100% control it presently
has. California has traded 55 electoral votes for an effective 56
electoral votes. At least California's decision would result in a
higher number of effective electoral votes for the State, but it would
still hand 89.6% of the decision to other states.
Legislatures of small states are committing a form of legislative malpractice by
joining the NPVIC. The NPVIC is the latest in a 250-year history of
schemes where the populous states are trying to bully and dominate the
small states in the country. Under the guise of the perceived
unfairness of specific presidential election outcomes, the large states
are trying to fool the small states into giving up the finely balanced
power they were guaranteed when they joined the United States. In
addition, as different states implement different rules for voting, all other states would suffer the corruption of the national popular vote by sanctuary states. Those states allow non-citizens to vote in some elections and/or make it likely that errors will result in ineligible people voting in presidential elections.
Constitutional Flaw #2: Popular Vote Coercion
In 1824 (the 10th presidential election in U.S. history), there were four
candidates. More importantly, there were many ways that states selected
their electoral votes. In the 1824 election, the states of Delaware,
Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South Carolina, and Vermont did not have
any popular votes for president. At that time, these states had a total
of 71 electoral votes out of a total of 261. These states used various
approaches to apportion their electors in the manner they felt
best. For instance, New York had electors vote for the following
candidates: Andrew Jackson (1), John Quincy Adams (26), Henry Clay (4),
and William Crawford (5).
States have significant flexibility in choosing their electors. A state could have strong antiwar conscientious objector feelings and decide that it is morally wrong to select the commander in
chief of the Armed Forces. In this case, the Legislature could devise a
random process to select electors, or select none at all, so as not to
trample on the feelings of their citizens. Another state could believe
strongly in astrology and think birth sign is the most important factor in determining a
commander in chief. Its Legislature could apportion electors using a
formula based on the birth signs of the candidates. Though the author
hopes these seem extreme to the reader, it could be argued that they
have a rational basis from the perspective of their state legislatures.
Many states have used methods other than the popular vote to select their
presidential electors in our nation's history. The NPVIC would force
states to hold popular votes for president or lose power within our
constitutional republic. This coercion would occur since unless states
held a popular vote, and their votes were added into the national total,
they would lose power relative to the states in the NPVIC. In the year
2000, the U.S. Supreme Court re-highlighted the right of state
legislatures to select electors through various means in Bush v. Gore.
These approaches included having the state legislatures take back the
ability to choose electors from the people.
Constitutional Flaw #3: Removal of Critical Safety Mechanism
In the last 13 presidential elections, there have been two where a
third-party candidate received more than 10% of the votes: 1968-Wallace
(13.5%) and 1992-Perot (18.9%). There were an additional two
presidential elections where a third-party candidate received more than
5% of the vote: 1980-Anderson (6.6%) and 1996-Perot (8.4%). In addition
to the earlier described 1824 election, the 1860 election in the
lead-up to the Civil War had four major candidates. In the 1860
Election, the percentages of the popular vote were as follows: Lincoln
(39.8%), Douglas (29.5%), Breckinridge (18.1%), and Bell (12.6%). The
electoral vote percentages that showed popularity by State were very
different: Lincoln (180), Douglas (12), Breckinridge (72), and Bell
(39). The electoral votes show that even though Douglas had almost 30%
of the national popular vote, he was the least preferred candidate when
states selected their electors.
As the number of candidates for election increases, the likelihood of
having an extreme candidate receive the most popular votes goes up
dramatically. Germany held a federal election in November of 1932, and
the results were as follows: National Socialist German Workers Party
(33.1%), Social Democratic Party of Germany (20.4%), Communist Party
(16.9%), Centre Party (11.9%), and the German National People's Party
(8.3%). If a fifth major candidate had run for president in the United
States in 1824 or 1860, the percentages could have appeared similar. If
the reader hasn't figured it out yet, the leader of the National
Socialist German Workers Party was Adolf Hitler. Even though fewer than
one third of all German voters selected the National Socialist German
Workers Party, the NPVIC approach would have automatically made Adolf
Hitler president with no safety mechanism.
The Electoral College is only part of the genius of the system our founders
created to select a president. There is a second step involved if no
candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes. This has happened
twice (1800 and 1824), but the 1824 case is the more
illustrative. When no candidate receives a majority of the electoral
votes, the election goes to the United States House of
Representatives. Each state gets a single vote to choose among the top
three recipients of electoral votes, as specified by the 12th Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. In 1824, Andrew Jackson had the most popular
votes, and the most electoral votes, but they were not a majority.
In 1824, Andrew Jackson was a political outsider who was eyed with
distrust in Washington. When the Election of 1824 went to the U.S.
House of Representatives, the states were allowed to identify the best
compromise candidate they could find from the top three electoral vote
recipients. The U.S. House voted: John Quincy Adams (13), Andrew
Jackson (7), and William Crawford (4). John Quincy Adams, the son of
our country's second president, was elected president by the House of
Representatives in 1824. In spite of losing the 1824 election in the
House of Representatives, Andrew Jackson came back to win the presidency
outright in the Electoral College in 1828 and 1832, and he is honored
on the $20 bill.
Conclusion
In the 13 presidential elections that the author can remember, he has felt
emotions ranging from being thrilled, being happy, being worried, and
being disgusted with the results. Since we live in a great country,
where honest Americans can have different views, the author is sure that
many people felt differently. Unfortunately, the fact that someone
doesn't like who wins specific elections is no excuse for trying to
dramatically change the genius of our presidential election
system. This paper shows how the NPVIC would not only be
unconstitutional in three key ways, but would potentially be dangerous
to our nation.
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